Thursday, October 21, 2010

The Yuan conundrum

The US is accusing China of artificially depressing the value of the Yuan. They said that China uses this to gain a competitive advantage on the world market for its exports. The more hawkish congressmen even alleged that China’s cheap export is causing job losses at home. The US manufacturers are unable to match China on the price of their produce.

So, is the Yuan really undervalued? The answer is probably yes. By how much is anybody’s guess? But, one thing is clear. A revaluation of the Yuan will in no way solve any of the US economic woes.

For China, the constant pressure from the west on its exchange rate is a big bugbear. How can it engineer a strategy and will pacify the rest of the world and at the same time not cause civil strife and economic slowdown in the country.

China has a foreign reserve of about $2.65 trillion. Of this, about 65% is held in US dollars. If China were to revalue its Yuan, then it would suffer a huge loss on its dollar holdings. If it decides to sell dollar to buy Yen or Euro, it would depress the value of the greenback. This would again result in losses for China.

The only way out is for China to revalue its Yuan slowly. Agradual increase in the value of the Yuan will result in higher household consumption. Exports will be affected slightly. On balance, the lost of foreign consumption would be compensated by domestic ones. This would have minimum impact on employment.

China cannot act in haste because of the foreign pressure. If it revalues too quickly, exports would be badly affected. This would force exporters into bankruptcy or move abroad. Workers would lose their jobs and their aggregate household income would drop. This would result in reduced domestic consumption. That would be the dreaded double whammy for China.

Friday, August 6, 2010

Deflation in Japan

The Japanese asset price bubble of the eighties started in 1985 with the establishment of the Plaza Accord. Quickly, the Yen doubled in value. With it, the property values skyrocketed. Stock market valuations also became stretched. The bubble burst in early 1990 when interest rate was raised. Since then, asset prices have been falling.

Starting 1999, the price of general goods has been falling too. This phenomenon is termed as deflation. The government, in trying to reflate the economy, pumped $1 trillion-plus into the economy by way of public-works spending, tax cuts and rebates in the last decade. It is now saddled with a public debt of about US$10 trillion – twice the GDP. Luckily, 90% of this debt is sourced domestically. (Japan has a household saving of some $15 trillions.) Otherwise, Japan could well be bankrupt. As such, the same formula of fiscal stimulus cannot be used further.

On the monetary side, its interest rate is at near zero (0.1 %) for years now. The only option left for the BoJ is on quantitative easing – making ample funds available for business and the public. Even this does not seem to work as businesses are reluctant to invest in a deflationary scenario. This is because the return under such an environment is uncertain and the debts are harder to pay off. The consumers, on the other hand are not spending as they feel that any purchase is likely to be cheaper in the future.

Deflation is causing wages to turn downwards. Coupled with a shrinking workforce, there is ample spare capacity in the country. The strong currency is also working against the manufacturing sector. However, a good work ethic is beating all these odds. The high productivity of the workers is helping the country to still achieve a trade surplus.

It is this good value, fiscal reforms and a strong monetary stimulus which will probably pull Japan out of deflation. The measures could range from an overhaul of the tax code, deregulation of farming, opening up of protected areas of the economy like transport and energy to foreign competition, boosting the birthrate and allowing more immigration. There is also the flip side to the strong currency. A strong Yen will enable a stronger consumer which in turn will stimulate domestic demand and spur growth.

Tuesday, June 8, 2010

How the PIIGS have gone to the pigs

The Euro came into existence on 1 January 1999. Before that, the PIIGS – Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, had their own currencies. These countries were, in the past, the weaker of the European economies. They had higher inflation and interest rates. They regularly devalued their currencies to maintain competitive.

Under the Euro, interest rate was standardized across the EU. This presented the PIIGS a sudden lowering of the cost of borrowing. The effect was a domestic consumption boom and a real estate bubble. This caused the costs to go up, especially labour. The problem was exacerbated by the immobility of the labour forces in the EU. The end result was a lowering of competitiveness. Unlike before, they are unable to devalue their currencies to regain competitiveness now.

Like the business sector, the easy credit induced the governments to borrowed more money to develop the countries. This caused a ballooning of their debts. An increase in government revenue due to the consumption boom gave the governments more confidence to embark on the lavish spending.

When the EU raised rates to fight inflation, the real estate bubble burst and the tax revenue collapsed. This resulted in them finding difficulty to service their huge debts.

The only way forward for the PIIGS is to lower wages and endure years of deflation and high unemployment. They have to go on a real austerity drive.

Thursday, April 15, 2010

The rising Ringgit

The Ringgit is doing pretty well since the beginning of the year. Against the US$, it has appreciated 7% in the last 3 months. It reached a level below RM3.2 to 1 US$ recently and is almost at a two-year high. The main reason for this bullishness is the optimism of a robust economy. The economy is expected to grow by 5.7% this year. Foreigners are also moving more money into the country to acquire assets.

The Ringgit has risen by a hefty 16% versus the US$ since the liberalization of the peg on 21 July 2005. Expectations are that it will rise further. This is because the Asia region economies are all expected to be doing very well in the next two years. The Chinese economy in particular is forecast to grow at a rate of 12% in the first quarter of this year. As a result, there is great pressure for the Yuan to be revalued. A surging Yuan will lend strength to the Ringgit and they will rise together.

Friday, March 12, 2010

Net investment flow

Since the relaxation of the country’s foreign exchange administration in April 2005, there has been an increase in the outflow of funds from the country. This is mainly due to the aggressive investment of foreign assets by Malaysian companies. To make matters worst, foreign direct investment in Malaysia has shrunk in the same period. This has resulted in a net outflow of RM50.0 billions in the last 3 years.

The main areas of investment abroad by Malaysian companies are banking, telecommunications, power and properties. Between 2006 and now, local banks have invested a total of RM25.3 billion in overseas banking assets.

Partly due to the huge outflow, the healthy external trade balance of RM118.3 billion and RM141.8 billion surpluses for years 2009 and 2008 respectively did not lift the country’s foreign reserve much. It rose only RM17.0 billion in the whole of 2009.

A direct result of the outpouring of funds to buy foreign assets is the reduction of investment at home. To plug the gap, the government has to bump up public spending to keep the economy going. In the process, the government chalked up a huge budget deficit of 7.4% of GDP in 2009.

The world financial crisis hit in 2008. In that year, there was a net portfolio investment outflow of RM84.3 billion from Malaysia. This caused a total deficit of RM118.5 billion in the balance on financial account in the year.

The outflow of funds has diminished the demand for the Ringgit. Consequently, the currency has been weak for the whole of 2008 and 2009. Things seem to have improved this year. Hopefully, it will end the year better.

Sunday, December 27, 2009

China's voracious appetite for commodities

China’s economy grew at a 9 % rate in 2008. It is one of the best growth figures in that year. This is despite the mortgage crisis hitting the US and by contagion, the rest of the world. Also, this has come after a decade long of double digit growth.

All this growth has increased China’s demand for commodities. In 2008, China consumed about 7.8 million barrels of oil per day. In the same year, the country consumed 3 billion short tons of coal, representing about 40 % of the world total. As for steel, it produced 37 % of the world total and used 35.5 %. In copper, China accounts for 29 % of the global usage in 2008.

To ensure a steady supply, China is embarking on a worldwide acquisition of natural resource based companies. In February this year, Chinalco agreed to invest US$19.5 bil in Anglo-Australian mining giant Rio Tinto Group. However, the investment was rejected by Rio Tinto. In June, Minmetals did successfully acquired OZ Minerals for US$1.4 bil. The prizes are a copper and gold mine in Laos and two zinc mines in Australia.

Sinopec had, in June, acquired Addax Petroleum Corp for US$7.3 bil. The buy gave Sinopec oil reserves in Iraq’s Kurdistan and West Africa. Two months later, Yanzhou Coal announced that it would buy Australian coal miner Felix Resources for US$2.9 bil. The following month, PetroChina said that it would buy 60 % of Athabasca Oil Sands Corp’s oil sands projects in Canada for US$1.7 bil.

US$ carry trade

It used to be the Japanese Yen that was fuelling the carry trades in the 1990s. Now, the US dollar is doing just that. Ever since the mortgage crisis in 2008, the Federal Reserve has lowered the Fed Funds Rate to near zero. This has caused an exodus of US money looking for better returns. The US dollar has flooded emerging markets causing a rise in asset prices.

The inflow of funds to emerging markets has also caused their currencies to appreciate. This is causing economic disruptions there. To counter this, some countries like Brazil and Taiwan have resorted to capital controls.

The big question is what happens when the carry trades are unwound. Will the emerging economies experience a sharp drop in asset prices? What about recession and deflation? Are the economies prepared for this? Who knows?